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WITH STATUTF--The case of Rompza v. Lucas' serves warning on all who
contemplate relying on the provisions of the Illinois statute which permits
service of process on the Secretary of State in actions involving nonresident
vehicle operators2 that close attention to statutory requirements is essential before the court can acquire valid jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant. The case arose out of an accident occurring in Illinois. Plaintiff sought to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant, pursuant to the
statute, by filing a copy of the summons with the Secretary of State and
by sending, through registered mail, a notice of such service and a copy
of the summons to the defendant at his last known address. Defendant's
signed receipt for the latter was obtained.3 Plaintiff then filed his affidavit
of compliance, bearing a date approximately one year after the accident,
in which the foregoing facts were recited together with a statement that
the defendant "is a nonresident of this state" and that defendant's last
known place of residence "is" a specified location in Wisconsin.4 Although
defendant had filed an answer, neither the court nor the plaintiff were
advised thereof and a default judgment was taken against defendant. The
latter subsequently moved to vacate the default judgment, contending the
service of process was defective, and was successful. On appeal by plaintiff, this order was affirmed on the ground that the affidavit of compliance
with the statute was deficient in that it did not make it appear that
defendant was a nonresident on the date of the accident but, rather, dis5
closed only that he was a nonresident on the date the affidavit was made.
The statute not having been strictly observed, the service was invalid.
The case appears to be the first one in Illinois considering the requirements for a sufficient affidavit to show compliance with the statute in
question. As the court is to determine its jurisdiction therefrom, it would
1337 I1.

App. 106, 85 N. E.

(2d) 467 (1949).

2 Il1.

Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95 , § 23.
3 As to the necessity for such receipt, see Powell v. Knight, 74 F. Supp. 191
(1947),

noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 275.

4 Emphasis has been added. The full text of the affidavit is set
Ill. App. 106 at 110, 85 N. E. (2d) 467 at 469.
5 See comment in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 159-62 on the case
District Court, 116 Colo. 330, 180 P. (2d) 525 (1947), dealing with
use substituted service against a resident who leaves the state after
but before service has been obtained.
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seem that the affidavit should affirmatively allege all basic facts necessary.
These facts are (1) that process has been served on the Secretary of
State; (2) that notice of such service, and a copy of the process so served,
has been sent, within ten days thereafter, by registered mail, to defendant
at his last known address; and (3) that the action arose out of the use and
operation of a vehicle, over the highways of Illinois, by one who was, at
the time the action accrued, then a nonresident of Illinois. The views
expressed in the instant case would seem to be preferred over the holding
in Biddle v. Boyd,6 involving a similar point, where the court made much
of the fact that defendant did not deny nonresidence at the time of the
accident. The desirability of having all jurisdictional facts disclosed in
the record should be apparent.
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SITTING IN THE SAME JURISDICTION-The Illinois Injuries Act prohibits

the bringing of an action in Illinois to recover damages for a death occurring outside of the state where a right of action for such death exists
under the law of the place where such death happened provided service of
process may be had upon the defendant in such place.' In Davidson v.
Gardner,2 the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit,
was called on to decide whether this prohibition also extended to a federal
court sitting in Illinois. Briefly, the fact situation was that the plaintiff's
husband was killed, while in the course of his employment as a railroad
switchman for the Burlington Railroad Company, in Kansas City, Missouri.
Death was caused when the decedent stepped into the path of a locomotive
operated by the Alton Railroad Company, of which the defendant was
trustee. Suit was brought in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois on two counts; one based on the Federal
Employers' Liability Act,3 the other under the Missouri wrongful death
statute. The principal defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that
the District Court did not have jurisdiction by reason of the Illinois
statute referred to above. The motion was denied and, after trial, judgment was awarded to the plaintiff. This judgment was affirmed on appeal
when the Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the decision in the case of
8 8 Harr. (Del.) 469, 193 A. 593 (1937).
1 Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 70, § 2.
2 172 F. (2d) 188 (1949).

3 45 U. S. C. A. § 51 et seq.
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Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company4 was controlling
on the point that the extent of the jurisdiction of federal courts is solely
a matter of congressional bestowal and not subject to limitation by any

5

state agency or statute, the rule of Erie Railroad Company v. Tonpkins

being confined solely to matters of substance and not of jurisdiction. The
significance of the case becomes apparent, however, and its soundness open
to doubt, when it

is contrasted with two recent cases decided by the

United States Supreme Court shortly after the opinion in the instant case
was handed down.

In

6
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation

and in Woods v. Interstate Realty Company,7 the highest court held that
state statutes regulating proceedings in state courts were binding on
federal courts when exercising jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of

citizenship.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER-APPEAL---WHETHER MOTION TO
VACATE JUDGMENT AND GRANT NEw TRIAL, UNSUPPORTED BY AFFIDAVIT,
STAYS RUNNING OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO PERFECT APPFAL-In the
recent case of Atlas Finishing Company v. Anderson,' the Appellate
Court for the First District was

required

to determine

whether

the

five-day limitation for the perfection of appeals in forcible entry and
detainer suits 2 begins to run from the date of entry of the judgment or
from the date of disposition of a motion that the judgment be vacated and
a new trial granted, where the case is heard by the court without a jury

and the motion is unaccompanied by affidavit. The plaintiff's suit for
possession of the premises was heard by the court without a jury,
resulting in a judgment in favor of plaintiff on March 12th. On March
A. L. R. 455 (1940).
5 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
6U. S. -, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. (adv.) 1221 (1949). Douglas, J., with
whom Frankfurter, J., concurred, wrote a dissenting opinion, as did Rutledge, J.
The case involved the applicability of a New Jersey statute, requiring security
for costs in a stockholder's representative suit, to a case pending in a federal
court.
7- U. S. -, 69 S. Ct. 1235, 93 L. Ed. (adv.) 1245 (1949). Jackson, J., wrote
a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Rutledge, J., and Burton, J. The case dealt
with the force of a Mississippi statute which made void all contracts entered into
by unlicensed foreign corporations. The majority required that the statute be applied to the federal court proceeding.
1 336 Ill. App. 167, 83 N. E. (2d) 177 (1949). Niemeyer, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. Information received from Eugene H. Dupee, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff,
indicates that appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was granted on a certificate of
importance but, following a settlement, the appeal was dismissed pursuant to stipulation of the parties.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 57, § 19.
4 110 F. (2d) 401, 132
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19th, defendant filed a written motion specifically asking that the judgment
be vacated and a new trial be granted. That motion was denied on the day
on which it was filed. On March 23rd, within five days after the denial
of defendant's motion but on the eleventh day after entry of judgment,
defendant filed notice of appeal, both from the judgment and also from
the final order denying the motion. Upon plaintiff's motion, the Appellate
Court, one judge dissenting, dismissed the appeal on the ground that it
was not properly perfected. The majority held that, as defendant's
motion failed to comply with the provisions of the Civil Practice Act
requiring that good cause for the vacating of a judgment be shown by
affidavit,' the same should not be considered as a motion to vacate the
judgment but rather a motion for new trial, particularly in view of the
fact that the defendant so labelled it in its notice of appeal. Granting
that Section 68 of the Civil Practice Act prevents truly final judgment
in jury cases until motions for new trial are disposed of,4 the court held
that that section did not apply to cases heard by the court without a jury,'
hence defendant's motion did not affect the finality of the judgment and,
a fortiori, did not stay the running of the jurisdictional time limitation
for the perfection of an appeal. 6
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Niemeyer laid great stress on the
well-established principle that, where a motion to vacate is made within
thirty days of entry of a judgment, no judgment can be regarded as final
until the motion is disposed of.7 It is to be noted, however, that the
majority opinion does not reject that rule. On the contrary, from the
manner in which the court went to great length to distinguish the motion
in the instant case from a motion to vacate a judgment, it is to be
inferred that, had the defendant's motion been construed to be one of
the latter type, a different result would have followed. The majority was
of the opinion that Section 50 of the Civil Practice Act,8 which requires
that good cause be shown by affidavit in support of a motion to vacate
a judgment, was controlling over the older provisions of the Judgment
3 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 174'.
4

Ibid., Ch. 110, § 192.

5 The court cited Climax Tag Co. v. American Tag Co., 234 Ill. 179, 84 N. E. 873
11908), which held that a motion for new trial in non-jury cases Is neither required
nor authorized by law or the rules of practice, and can serve no purpose whatever
in preserving questions for review.
6 See Chicago Housing Authority v. Frank, 335 Ill. App. 456, 82 N. E. (2d) 205
(1948).
7 Hosking v. Southern Pac. Co., 243 Ill. 230, 90 N. E. 669 (1910) ; Majewski v.
Pozdol, 19S Ill. App. 400 (1915).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 174.
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Act, silent on the point." The motion in question, lacking an affidavit,
was said to be a motion for some other purpose. The dissenting judge,
by contrast, was of the opinion that the right to move within thirty days
to vacate judgment should not be restricted to the remedy provided by
the Civil Practice Act 1 ° and that, regardless to the name given, the
motion was, in substance, a motion to vacate the judgment and should
have been given that effect.
The dissenting opinion is not without support in its holding that
the motion involved should have been given the effect of a motion to
vacate judgment. In the earlier case of Hosking v. Southern Pacific
Company, 1 where the trial court heard the case without a jury and the
motion was similar to the one in the instant case, the Appellate Court
held that, although a motion for a new trial in non-jury cases is entirely
useless so far as preserving any question for review is concerned, no rule
of law prevents the trial judge from entertaining such a motion and it is,
in effect, an application for a rehearing which, when entertained, suspends
the finality of the judgment already entered. The Supreme Court, affirming the decision, also treated the motion as one to vacate a judgment,
sufficient to stay the same and prevent time from running. The instant
decision would also seem to be in direct conflict with the holding in
Geisler v. Bank of Brussels,12 wherein the court indicated that the
pertinent provisions of the Judgment Act were controlling over the Civil
Practice Act provisions rather than vice versa. The present case, then,
appears to produce an unwarranted technical application of the Civil
Practice Act not in harmony with its avowed purposes. 3

NEGLIGENCE-ACTIONS--WHETHER

ALLEGATION

OF

FREEDOM

FROM

CONTRIBUTORY WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT IS ESSENTIAL IN STATEMENT OF CASE BASED ON DEFENDANT'S WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT

-In

the recent case of Prater v. Buell,' the plaintiff filed suit to recover

for injuries allegedly resulting from the purported willful and wanton
9 Ibid., Ch. 77, § 83.

10 The dissenting judge cited Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Legg,
374 Ill. 306, 29 N. E. (2d) 515 (1940). That case held that a court has inherent
power to vacate a judgment during term time independently of any statutory
authority.
11 148 Ill. App. 11 (1909), affirmed in 243 Ill. 320, 90 N. E. 669 (1910).
12316 Il1. App. 309, 44 N. E. (2d) 754 (1942), abst. opin.
13 Counsel for plaintiff notes that the ruling may have significance in other
proceedings, beside forcible detainer cases, where the appeal period is shorter than
the one generally applicable to civil suits. He specifically refers to cases under
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 46, § 6 et seq., and Ch. 102, § 16.
1336 Ill. App. 533, 84 N. E. (2d) 676 (1949).
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misconduct of the defendant who owned and operated a dairy farm upon
which the plaintiff worked as a farm hand. While the plaintiff was driving
a herd of cattle to the barn, as part of his regularly prescribed duties,
he was gored by a bull. The complaint charged willful and wanton
misconduct on the part of defendant in that he had repeatedly baited and
annoyed the bull thereby greatly increasing its vicious propensities. The
defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had failed
to state a cause of action, inasmuch as his complaint did not allege freedom
from contributory willful and wanton misconduct, was sustained. On
appeal from a judgment dismissing the suit because plaintiff refused to
plead further, the Appellate Court for the Third District affirmed the
ruling. In this, the first case in Illinois which has held that an allegation
of freedom from contributory willful and wanton misconduct is an essential allegation in a complaint charging the defendant with similar conduct,
the court has based its holding on the same principle which has led to the
well-settled doctrine that freedom from contributory negligence is an
essential allegation in an action based on simple negligence.2 The principle
that no one shall be permitted to profit from a wrong to which he has
contributed has also been applied in suits based on willful and wanton
misconducts but it does not appear that an allegation of freedom from
conduct of that type has heretofore been regarded as necessary to the
statement of a case. 4 Now that the same has become essential, the customary phrase to the effect that plaintiff was "exercising due care and
caution for his own safety" may be insufficient in view of the fact that
the presence of simple negligence is no defense to a suit based on willful
misconduct.5

PLEADING-PROFERT,

OYER

AND

EXHIBITS-WHETHER

NECESSARY

ALLEGATIONS OF A COMPLAINT MAY BE SUPPLIED BY AN UNNECESSARY ExHIBIT

ATTACHED TO COMPLAINT-The Appellate Court for the First Dis-

trict had opportunity in the late case of Morris v. Broadview, Inc.,' to
2Hanson v. Trust Co. of Chicago, 380 Ill. 194, 43 N. E. (2d) 931 (1942).
3 Walsh v. Gazin, 316 Ill. App. 311, 45 N. E. (2d) 95 (1942). A special interrogatory finding plaintiff guilty of willful and wanton misconduct was there set
aside as being unsupported by the evidence.
4 The complaint in Walsh v. Gazin, 316 Ill. App. 311, 45 N. E. (2d) 95 (1942),
tbe most recent one on the subject, seems merely to have alleged that the plaintiff
was "in the exercise of ordinary care."
5 Heidenreich v. Bremner, 260 Ill. 439, 103 N. E. 275 (1913).
1338 Il. App. 99, 86 N. E. (2d) 863 (1949).
Niemeyer, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. See also the related case of Morris v. Broadview, Inc., 385 Ill. 228, 52 N. E.
(2d) 769 (1944), reversing 317 Ill. App. 436, 46 N. E. (2d) 174 (1943), noted in 22
CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 201.
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discuss the effect of Section 36 of the Civil Practice Act.2 Plaintiff therein
was a certificate holder in the defendant corporation and had requested,
by mail, a list of all other corporate certificate holders, beneficiaries of a
trust, for the purpose, as stated therein, of "discussing with them the
advisability of opposing any attempt by you to further extend the trust
and insisting upon a sale of the property. "3 Upon defendant's refusal to
comply, plaintiff filed a complaint in equity asking, among other things,
for an order compelling the defendant to furnish the list of certificate
holders. The complaint itself contained no allegation as to plaintiff's
purpose in making the request but, in the copy of plaintiff's letter to
defendant attached to the complaint as an exhibit, the purpose was there
set out. The trial court struck the complaint on motion and dismissed
the suit on the ground that the Business Corporation Act, 4 upon which
plaintiff rested his claim, required that the list be given only for a proper
purpose which should have been specifically alleged in the complaint, and
the exhibit attached, not being required by Section 36 of the Civil Practice
Act, merely served as evidence of the demand and nothing more. The
Appellate Court reversed, one justice dissenting, when it decided that the
words of Section 36 to the effect that, in pleading any written instrument,
a "copy thereof may be attached to the pleading as an exhibit" and that
"the exhibit shall constitute a part of the pleading for all purposes,"
mean exactly what they apparently seem to say. Although the first part
of the code section clearly refers to the attaching of certain mandatory
exhibits on which the claim is founded, 5 not concerned here, the last portion
is cast in permissive language.6 The final sentence thereof, declaring exhibits to be parts of the pleading "for all purposes," has now been made
to apply to both types of exhibits. The advantage, from the standpoint of
the plaintiff, is obvious.
WILLs--RIGHTS
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WHETHER ILLINOIS PROBATE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ORDER CONSERVATOR OF INCOMPETENT LEGATEE TO RENOUNCE WILL ON WARD'S BEHALF--

Under the appeal taken in the recent case of In re Reighard's Estate,1 the
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 160.
3 338 Ill. App. 99 at 102, 86 N. E. (2d) 863 at 864-5.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.45.
5 Failure to attach exhibits of this character, or give adequate explanation for
the failure, will make the complaint subject to a motion to strike: Sarelas v.
Fagerburg, 316 Ill. App. 606, 45 N. E. (2d) 690 (1943).
6 See Nichols, Illinois Civil Practice (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1941), Vol. 2,
p. 34, § 794.
1402 Ill. 364, 84 N. E. (2d) 345 (1949).
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Illinois Supreme Court was asked to consider whether an Illinois county
court had the power to order the conservator of an incompetent person's
estate to renounce a will in behalf of his ward. The will there concerned
devised a portion of the estate to a trustee who also served as executor.
The trustee was directed to pay the net income from the trust estate to
the testator's surviving widow for life with a remainder over upon her
death. The will further provided that, if any person entitled to the
payment of money under the will should become disabled, the trustee
should retain all monies so payable and apply only so much thereof as
he deemed necessary for the proper support and maintenance of the
disabled beneficiary. One month after the will was admitted to probate,
the testator's widow was declared incompetent by the same county court
and a conservator was appointed over her person and estate. He filed a
petition in the court of his appointment seeking a direction as to whether
he should renounce the will in behalf of the widow and was ordered so to
do. The trustee and executor, having been notified of the proceeding and
having participated in the hearing thereon, appealed to the circuit court,
claiming that the petition should be dismissed on the ground that the
county court, and the circuit court on appeal, each lacked jurisdiction in
that renunciation might be ordered only by a court of chancery. It was
also urged that the proceeding, being an ex parte one, should be dismissed
for want of necessary parties. The motion was denied and the order was
affirmed. On further appeal to the Supreme Court,2 that decision was
affirmed on the authority of the earlier case of Davis v. Mather.3 That
case had held that an Illinois probate court, under a statute conferring
equitable jurisdiction over the estates of incompetent wards,4 did have
the power to order a renunciation of a will whenever it was determined
that such action was for the best interest of the incompetent ward.
Although the statute referred to therein was since repealed, the sense
thereof forms the present Section 50 of the new Probate Act.5 The practice
has not, in this respect, been in anyway changed from that which
formerly prevailed.'

2 Direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was proper under Ill. Rev. Stat.
1947, Ch. 110, § 199(1).
3 309 Ill. 284, 141 N. E. 209 (1923).
4 Hurd's Rev. Stat. 1921, Ch. 3, § 78.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 202.
6 The court also noted that, as renunciation is a matter of right, there is no
occasion for notifying the legatees and devisees of the fact of renunciation except
as the same is made of record, hence an ex parte proceeding to obtain direction
with regard thereto is proper.
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AcT-Attention is directed to the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court

for the First District in the case of Victor v. Dehmlow' wherein the court
had to determine whether or not the minor son of the deceased defendant
was an employee of the latter within the meaning of that term as used
in the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act. 2 The question became
important in order to decide whether the defendant was entitled to the
benefits of Section 29 thereof3 or whether plaintiff might maintain an
action for the wrongful death of her intestate husband. The cause arose
out of an accident in which the plaintiff's intestate was struck and killed
by defendant's truck operated by defendant's minor son. The son had
been sent on a business errand and was returning to the place of business
when the accident occurred. It was conceded that the employer of
plaintiff's intestate as well as defendant's intestate were operating under
the act at the time of the accident but it was urged that the death of
plaintiff's intestate did not arise out of and in the course of his employment and also that the minor son was not an employee of his father at
the time of the accident. In support of the latter contention, it was
shown in evidence that the son was a school boy, that he was not paid
wages, that no social security taxes were paid for him, that he drove the
truck for his father only after school hours, and that his father supported

4
him; all tending to show an absence of any contractual relationship.
Both issues were resolved in favor of plaintiff at the trial and she
recovered judgment. An appeal by defendant forced consideration of the
same two points.

It was decided that the deceased employee died from an accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment, 5 and that the minor
1336 Ill. App. 432, 84 N. E. (2d) 342 (1949).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 138 et seq.
3 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 166. That section is intended to govern those situations in which
the employee is injured through the negligent conduct of someone other than his
employer. If the offending party is also bound by the Act, the injured person's
employer is obligated to provide him with compensation benefits, the injured employee being limited to the statutory remedy, while all right to recover from the
offending party is transferred to the employer of the injured party. Otherwise, the
injured party has an election to recover from his employer, with subrogation
accordingly, or to proceed directly against the offending party in a common law
action.
4 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 142(second), defines an "employee" as one "in the service of
another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written . . . including aliens, and minors."
5 That ruling, while important to the outcome of the case, was not novel.
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son, driving the truck, was a covered employee because of the evident
legislative purpose to include as such even those who had no fixed rate
of compensation.6 The court found no occasion to distinguish between
minors employed by strangers and those employed by their parents. The
case, however, has far-reaching implications for, if the minor so employed
is a covered employee where third persons are concerned, it would seem
to follow that he should also be treated as such when he becomes the
victim of an industrial accident connected with the parent's business. 7 A
way now seems to have been opened up to claims for compensation by
minors who perform only casual services, often exacted by the parent as
a part of the child's training. It would seem, then, that stronger proof
should have been required to establish a contract of hiring than appears
in the record of the instant case, unless the court is willing to permit any
minor child to have his action against the parent for physical harm
suffered at the parent's hands.

6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 147(f), provides a method for the computation of
compensation to be paid to an employee who receives no fixed wage.
7A wage-earning but unemancipated minor child has been held entitled to compensation benefits against the parent's insurance carrier, despite the general public
policy forbidding suits between parent and child over Injury inflicted by the one
on the other, in Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A. L. R. 1055
(1930).

